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Abstract 
 
This paper empirically investigates the linkages between the CDS index market and the 
equity returns of a sample of systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs). Both the 5-
year investment grade iTraxx Europe and the 5-year investment grade CDX North America 
indexes are adopted as a market consensus of the overall credit risk in the financial system. 
Through a multivariate VAR model using historical data, the investigation uncovers three key 
findings. First, the equity returns for all systematically important institutions are inversely 
associated to shocks in the CDS index market. Second, European institutions demonstrate a 
stronger connection with the iTraxx whilst the US institutions are more closely related to the 
CDX. Furthermore, volatility originating in the CDS index market is unambiguously 
transmitted to both the insurance and the banking sector. Third, US banks are most severely 
distressed by the volatility transmission mechanism whilst European insurers are least 
affected. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) are financial institutions that are 
deemed systemically important to the economy in the sense that the failure of one of them 
could trigger a global financial crisis. Investment banks and insurance companies retaining 
large exposures to credit risk thus represent SIFIs. 
Global institutions have demonstrated a continuous emphasis on managing credit risk. 
Although bonds and loans are still significant, the vast majority of credit risk now arises from 
derivative transactions. The shift is directly associated with the sharp growth in the over-the-
counter (OTC) derivatives market which reached a colossal $600 trillion at the end of 2010. 
Outstanding notional for credit default swaps (CDSs) stood at $30 trillion during the same 
period. However, through portfolio compression and clearing, the CDS market has recently 
contracted significantly from previous years. 
In essence, the function of a CDS instrument is to transfer credit risk to increase the 
overall resilience of the financial sector. Credit risk transfer (CRT) increases diversification 
and thus transfer risk outside the banking system to other market investors – such as 
insurance companies and hedge funds. Through continuous trading, CDS spreads have 
significantly enhanced the transparency in assessing credit conditions for capital market 
stakeholders. 
CDS indices are benchmarks for protecting investors owning bonds against default, 
and traders use them to speculate on changes in credit quality. There are currently two main 
families of CDS indices: CDX and iTraxx. These indices permit investors to take a position 
on a basket of credit entities rather than many single name CDS which can be significantly 
more costly. In fact, since these indices are standardised, the increased liquidity is likely to 
result in lower spreads being charged. 
Although the overall welfare consequences of using derivatives are ambiguous, CDS 
played a vital role in the 2008-2009 financial crisis. The collapse of Lehman Brothers in 
September 2008 sent shockwaves around global markets. As a result, major European and US 
financial institutions came to the brink of failure. Those SIFIs with a greater exposure to US 
mortgage based securities required immediate rescuing, forcing governments to pump multi-
trillion bailouts into the banking sector to guarantee liabilities. 
Our objective in this paper is to investigate the relation between changes in the level 
of the CDX and iTraxx indices and the equity prices of a group of SIFIs. In particular, we 
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focus on a number of US as well as European-based systemically important banks and 
insurance companies whose failure can pose negative externalities to the financial system. 
Two crucial questions that arise in investigating this potential linkage are: do 
fluctuations in the CDX and iTraxx indices play a significant role in transmitting shocks 
across the financial system? Does exist an empirical relationship between the dynamic 
patterns of the CDX and iTraxx indices and changes in the equity prices of SIFIs? 
To address these questions, we develop tests that exploit the richness of our dataset 
and builds upon Yang et al. (2006) who employ generalized forecasts error variance 
decompositions (GVDs) to examine short-run dynamic causal linkages across the stock 
markets in Central and Eastern Europe, before and after the 1998 Russian financial crisis. 
Moreover, our paper is related to a growing body of empirical work featuring GVDs to 
measure systemic risk and financial connectedness for a set of the largest international 
financial institutions around the recent global credit crisis (e.g. Yang and Zhou (2013), 
Diebold and Yilmaz (2014)). 
Hence, this article contributes to the literature by analysing a key aspect of the 
relationship between CDS indices prices and the equity value of a selected group SIFIs, and 
assesses the extent to which SIFIs’ asset prices are driven by the volatility in the CDS index 
market. Our focus is on the evolution of spreads levels characterizing CDS indices markets. 
Our analysis relies on a representative dataset of CDS prices spanning the entire 
financial crisis period (2007-2011). Although there exist CDS contracts of different 
maturities, the most liquid are the 5-year maturity. Therefore, this paper restricts itself to the 
daily 5-year CDS spreads. 
The global financial system comprises thousands of banks and other financial 
institutions of various sizes and types. To better capture its complexity, this paper focuses on 
a defined group of the very largest institutions. Accordingly, the sample of banking 
organizations used here includes firms that have been identified by the Financial Stability 
Board (FSB) as globally systemically important financial institutions (G-SIFIs)
1
. In 
particular, in November 2011 the Financial Stability Board published an integrated set of 
policy measures to address the systemic and moral hazard risks associated with systemically 
important financial institutions (SIFIs). In that publication, the FSB has identified an initial 
group of G-SIFIs, namely 29 global systemically important banks (G-SIBs), using a 
                                                          
1
 G-SIFIs are defined by the FSB as “institutions of such size, market importance, and global interconnectedness 
that their distress or failure would cause significant dislocation in the global financial system and adverse 
economic consequences across a range of countries. 
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methodology developed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). 
Furthermore, the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) has developed a 
related initial assessment methodology to identify any insurers whose distress or disorderly 
failure, because of their size, complexity and interconnectedness, would cause significant 
disruption to the global financial system and economic activity. Any such insurers will be 
regarded as systemically important on a global basis. Global systemically important insurers 
(G-SIIs) are one class of G-SIFIs. 
This allows us to adopt a homogeneous set of SIFIs. 
The main reason we focus our analysis on this particular category of institutions is 
that the resilience and stability of these institutions is of particular concern to central banks 
and financial regulators
2
. The extent to which regulators understand the stability aspects of 
credit risk transfer and the effects of complex financial products in financial markets is surely 
an important one, and has been the subject of recent research by – among others - Allen and 
Carletti (2006), Allen and Gale (2004), Brunnermeier (2008), Duffie (2008), Gorton (2009) 
and Longstaff (2010). Consequently, knowledge of the extent to which SIFIs are interrelated 
– and exposed -to other financial markets is important for the assessment of risks to financial 
stability emanating from these institutions. 
Our empirical approach proceeds in four steps. 
First, we study the nature of systemic credit risk using CDS spreads for the US CDX 
and the Europe iTraxx indices, since CDS premia are generally regarded as a critical measure 
of market confidence. Second, we examine the issue of correlations between the indices and 
an institution’s equity value. In this study, banking and insurance equity prices are standard 
measurement proxies for financial stability under the assumption that the viability of such 
organisations plays a crucial role in maintaining a healthy economy. A Vector Autoregressive 
(VAR) framework is thus utilised to analyse price changes, following shocks in the CDS 
market. Third, we employ generalized forecast variance decompositions to establish lead-lag 
causal relationships between the CDX and iTraxx indices and the group of SIFIs. Fourth, we 
estimate the influence that volatility in the CDS market transmits to the volatility of the 
SIFIs’ equity prices. The volatility clustering assumptions suggest the magnitude of asset 
returns appear in clusters. Large returns (in either direction) are expected to follow large 
                                                          
2
 See the recent regulatory proposals by the Global Financial Stability Board and the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision. 
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returns. To measure volatility transmission effects, we specify and estimate a generalised 
autoregressive conditional heteroschedastic (GARCH) model. 
A number of important empirical results emerge from this analysis. 
First, we uncover a negative correlation between the movements of the CDX and 
iTraxx indices and the equity returns for all the 30 SIFIs. Most notably, the CDX index 
possesses the greatest explanatory power in the variation of the equity returns of all the SIFIs. 
Second, volatilities of the returns of the CDX index tend to be transmitted to the 
volatilities of equity returns of the financial institutions. Both the US and the European SIFIs 
are significantly affected. 
Third, our empirical evidence from the Granger causality test reveals a strong 
interconnectivity between the CDS indices. The five year investment grade CDX appears as 
the dominant index since not only contributes to pricing discovery in the five year investment 
grade iTraxx Europe but also leads this process. Hence, although financial markets are 
naturally inclined to follow a ‘random walk’, this suggests that arbitrage opportunities may 
exist for market participants. However, these are likely to disappear very rapidly as efficient 
markets do adjust spreads back to equilibrium. 
Fourth, quite strikingly, our empirical evidence uncovers a strong association of 
negative sign between the geographical location of a SIFI and a shock in the corresponding 
CDS index market. Accordingly, the iTraxx exhibits a more dominant impact on all European 
institutions selected in the study, whilst the CDX demonstrates a larger impact on the US 
institutions. These results are somewhat surprising since they seem to tell us that 
globalisation has a neutral impact on international diversification activities. However, 
remarkably a larger ‘non-dominant’ index impact on the insurers suggests the insurance 
sector is diversifying its activities across the Atlantic at a faster pace than the banking sector. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 
3 discusses the econometric methodology. The results are presented and interpreted in 
Section 4. Section 5 summarises the main findings and offers concluding remarks. 
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2. Dataset 
 
2.1 Equity Returns 
 
Equity returns are utilised in this study as a measure of financial stability, since the 
stock market performance of systematically important institutions can severely disrupt the 
financial system. For the purpose of consistency, equity returns are displayed in a single US 
dollar format for each participating institution. 
This research is centred on thirty SIFIs, all of whom are heavily exposed to credit 
sensitive instruments. In order to further enhance the analysis, institutions are evenly split 
into two subgroups, namely banks and insurance companies. A large data range and sectoral 
segregation permit a comprehensive analysis to determine underlying issues transpiring in the 
financial system. 
Daily returns provide a larger dataset, and capture additional shocks in comparison to 
an investigation comprising of data with a lower frequency. Furthermore, the study maintains 
an adequate amount of consistency through obtaining returns at close price. Returns are 
subsequently filtered into the two independent work files to remove existing anomalies. 
Post filtering, exactly 1414 daily observations are included in the bank and index data 
for the selected time period. In contrast, 1501 daily returns are observed between the 
insurance companies and index data. 
 
2.2 Bank Data 
 
Banks are highly diverse financial intermediaries, dealing in a range of financial 
activities such as underwriting and brokerage. A group of fifteen global investment banks are 
included in the study (see Table 1). As stated previously, the selection criteria are based upon 
the ‘too big to fail’ FSB classification and institutions with a large exposure to credit risk 
through long positions in CDs. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
Banks retaining large positions in CDs are revealed to hold a larger proportion of 
nonperforming loans, therefore signalling neglected resources when completing essential 
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credit checks. Furthermore, the lower performing loans entailed additional expense in 
resolving bad and doubtful debts. The ‘short-termism’ views of the fifteen selected banks 
thus encountered significantly higher adverse effects during the subprime meltdown, in 
comparison to their more prudent counterparts. 
 
 2.3 Insurance Company Data 
 
We also collect equity prices data for fifteen of the world’s largest insurance 
companies. Specifically, we consider seven insurers identified by the IAIS as SIFIs. In 
addition to this sub-group, we also include eight global insurers acting as key counterparties 
in most CDs transactions (see Table 2). 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
2.4 CDS Index Data 
 
This study includes daily midmarket spreads for the two most liquid CDS indices: the 
investment grade North American CDX and iTraxx Europe with reference issues ranked 
senior and CDS maturities of 5 years. Pricing is freely available on a daily basis since 
transparency is an important advantage of utilising CDS indices. 
The 5-year Markit CDX North America comprises of 125 Investment grade issuers, 
each covering equal principle amounts of debt. Since the Markit CDX index is accepted as a 
market consensus of the overall credit risk, spread returns are adopted to serve as the 
benchmark for market confidence. Higher investment grade spreads therefore suggest low 
market confidence and thus a weaker economy. The notional amounts for the CDS indices 
data are all specified in dollars. 
The 5-year iTraxx Europe main index is composed of 125 of the most liquid 
investment grade credits. Similar to the CDX, returns in the iTraxx index encapsulates credit 
risk for a representative sample of European corporates. This implies correlations are likely to 
exist between both indices. 
Institutional equity data is gathered from Thomson Reuters DataStream3. CDX and 
iTraxx prices come from Bloomberg which collects CDS market quotation data from industry 
sources. The sample covers the period from January 2005 to June 2011. 
                                                          
3
 Primary financial data (filtered and unfiltered) is available upon request. 
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INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
 
3. Methodology 
 
In this study, we provide an entirely new perspective on the interaction between the 
CDS index market and the risk profile of a financial institution. The risk profile of the 
financial institution is determined by the value and volatility of equity. Decreasing equity 
values and increasing volatility contribute to the institution’s fragility. When developments 
occur simultaneously for a number of institutions following the same ‘credit market’ shock 
systemic risk will rise causing a marked deterioration of financial stability. 
This section briefly outlines the econometric model employed to examine the linkages 
between CDS indices and SIFIs. 
 
3.1 Assessing the Impact of the CDS Indices on SIFIs Equity Value 
 
In the first step, we use a VAR model to test the possible impact of CDS indices on 
the market valuation of each individual financial institution. 
The new macroeconomic framework provided by Sims (1992) captures the evolution 
of endogenous variables and independencies between multiple time series as a natural 
generalisation of univariate models. Each variable is in turn explained by its own lagged 
values, in addition to recent and historic data (Stock and Watson, (2007)). Furthermore, VAR 
models do not require the estimation of endogenous and exogenous variables since all 
variables are treated as endogenous. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
To identify the impact on other endogenous variables in the structure of the VAR, 
namely the institutions equity return, we compute generalised forecast error variance 
decompositions (GVDs) between the equity and index returns. The advantage of considering 
this testing procedure is that shocks are not depending on variable ordering. Note that in 
general shocks will gradually fade away only in a stable system. Hence, to ensure estimation 
accuracy we employ a time horizon of 10 days-ahead. 
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GVDs are computed and compared to determine which index has a larger impact on 
individual institutions in the VAR model. 
A VAR framework constitutes a convenient framework to assess the 
interrelationships within a system of variables when the imposition of strong a-priori 
restrictive assumptions cannot be derived by economic theory. 
Assume that the interconnections between the variables of interest can be depicted by 
the structural linear system that relates the vector of variables Y  in the system: 
0 1 1( )      t=1,...,T (1)t t tA Y A L Y    
 
The vector of structural disturbances (n x 1) t  consists of independent random 
variables with zero mean stochastic elements with diagonal covariance matrix 
'( )t tE     . 
The contemporaneous relationship between the variables is depicted by 0A , whose diagonal 
elements are normalised to the value of unity and 1( )A L  is a matrix polynomial in the lag 
operator. 
Associated with the structural form, the ‘observed’ reduced form of the model given 
by (1) can be represented by a VAR model of the form: 
 
1( )               (2)t t tY B L Y e   
 
The covariance matrix of the reduced form disturbances e is given by: 
'( )t tE e e  . 
From (1) and (2) is obvious that the structural errors and the reduced form disturbances are 
related by the following equation: 
 
1                            (3)t o tA e
  
 
To recover the parameters of interest 0A  and   from the estimation of (2) the 
imposition of parameter restrictions on   is required. This matrix is symmetric with 
2( 1) / 2n   distinct elements requiring the imposition of restrictions. The necessary condition 
for exact identification of the structural parameters is that the number of parameters in 0A  
and   is the same as the number of non-zero elements in  . The main advantage of 
employing the SVAR methodology is the evaluation of the system responses to structural 
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shocks using the reduced form VAR model and a relatively small number of exclusion 
restrictions. Writing model (2) in its equivalent moving-average form we obtain: 
 
1 1( )  =C e +C e +....                  (4)t t o t tY C L e   
 
The MA coefficients are related to the reduced form parameters via the recursion: 
 
0 1 1 2 1 1 2, ,C I C B C B C B       (5) 
 
and their sum is given by: 
1
0 1
*
p
i i
i i
C C I B


 
 
   
 
   (6) 
 
Simple exclusion restrictions can be imposed that guarantee exact identification. The 
most common assumption is that   is a diagonal matrix, the covariance of the structural 
shocks is zero. Further exclusion restrictions can be imposed on 0A , and subsequently on the 
structure of   that allow to identify the estimated system. The use of such restrictions has 
been questioned by Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2005) who argue that restrictions should 
originate from the underlying behavioural model that generates the VAR, and they are not to 
be used for empirical convenience. Sims (1980) suggested that simple short run exclusion 
restrictions can be imposed in the presence of a natural timing sequence in the manner the 
shocks that affect the system. Long-run restrictions motivated by the description of 
equilibrium derived from economic theory can be used to provide identifying restrictions. By 
postulating 0A  as a lower triangular the system assumes a recursive structure and this along 
with the restricted nature of   provides for the exact identification of the unrestricted VAR. 
Under such conditions a well-defined two-step procedure can be used to extract 
estimates of the structural parameters from the estimation of the reduced form. 
The algorithm requires that the estimate 
^
  is obtained from (2) and the structural 
model coefficients are obtained from maximizing the likelihood function that obtains 
consistent and efficient estimates of the parameters of interest. 
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The variance of each element of tY  can be decomposed into components due to each 
element of t  for various horizons. 
 
1
1 1
0 0
0
( ) {( ) ( ) '}
j
t t j i i
i
Var Y C A C A

 


    (8) 
In addition the dynamic response of each element to a shock is traced via the 
computation of the following generalized variance decomposition for the forecasting error: 
 
 
 
 
 




n
l
illi
n
l
jliii
c
ij
eAAe
eAe
n
0
''
2
0
'1
   (9) 
 
Where ii  is the iith element of the residual variance-covariance matrix  , and te  is a 
selection vector, with the ith cohort equal to 1 and all the other cohorts equal to 0. Therefore, 
c (n)ij θ measures the contribution of the jth-innovation to the variance of the total n-step 
ahead forecasting error for the variable itY . 
In the VAR, variance decomposition separates the variation in an endogenous variable 
into the component shocks to the VAR. Thus, the variance decomposition provides 
information about the relative importance of each random innovation in affecting the 
variables in the VAR. 
The GVD tells us the proportion of the movements in a sequence due to its “own” 
shocks versus shocks to the other variable. Unlike the orthogonalized variance decomposition 
and impulse response functions obtained using the Choleskey factorization, the generalized 
variance decomposition and impulse response functions are unique solution and invariant to 
the ordering of the variables in the VAR (Koop et al. 1996; and Pesaran and Shin, 1998). 
Although simple, the VAR framework provides a useful way of determining the 
institution’s equity prices responses to CDS indices shocks. However, limitations of VAR 
analysis essentially require discussion to minimise any negative reflection on the significance 
of the results. First, VAR usually requires a large number of parameters, even when the lag 
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order is relatively low. The majority of institutions display a lag of order two. By adopting 
the parameter formula discussed earlier, a three variable two lag model requires the 
estimation of 30 parameters. 
When positive shocks to either or both of the indices impact negatively on equity 
returns, the value of the equity declines resulting in increased institutional fragility due to the 
progressive reduction to the value of equity capital. 
We estimate 30 three-equations VAR systems of the form: 
, 1{ log( ) , log( ) , }
T
t t i t td cdx d itrx r   where dlog(.) denotes the continuously compounded returns 
of  CDX and iTraxx indices whilst ,i tr  is the return of the SIFI (i). In the absence of a fully 
specified behavioural model, the adoption of this methodology allows to establish the 
existence and the nature of a statistical causal relationship between the evolution of the 
indices of the credit derivatives markets and the equity returns of SIFIs. Our interest is the 
exploration for such impact rather than the acquisition of estimates of the behavioural 
structural parameters. What is of importance in this case is the identification of shocks as 
‘structural’. 
Each VAR test involves the estimation using three variables: the financial institution 
equity return, the CDX index premia and the iTraxx index premia. 
 
                                   
         
 
Where Ri,t denotes the return of institution i, and Rlog() represents the continuous 
compounded return for both CDX and iTraxx indices – frequently referred to as the ‘shock 
variables’. 
The VAR model attempts to establish causal connections among equity prices and 
index returns, whilst avoiding the requisite to specify exogenous and endogenous variables. 
This suggests the model can verify the direction of the relationship to determine whether 
shocks in the institutions follow the index or vice versa. A key objective of the study is also 
to provide an intuitive economic interpretation of the relationships between these three 
variables. 
 
3.2 Assessing the Impact of the CDS Indices on SIFIs Equity Volatility 
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As discussed earlier in the paper, we use a univariate GARCH (1,1) model to assess 
the volatility in the CDS index markets and its transmission into the banking and insurance 
sector. 
Spillovers effects do increase equity risk and as such significantly weaken financial 
stability, since individual financial distress will propagate to other financial institutions. 
Furthermore, excessive volatility in CDS indices may destabilize a large number of key SIFIs 
leading to disruptive consequences. Estimating and understanding the transmission 
mechanism is therefore a major objective of the study. 
Since the variance in the error term U is unlikely to remain constant, it seems natural 
to adopt GARCH modelling to parameterise the returns. These models take into consideration 
volatility clustering, visible in both the CDX and iTraxx data. Furthermore, volatility is also 
assumed to be autocorrelated in equity returns. Therefore, one can assume the conditional 
variance of the error term as being dependent on the value of the previous term. 
The multivariate GARCH model utilises the three key components of the analysis 
with the institutions equity return being treated as the dependent variable. Since a GARCH 
(1,1) model is adopted, a one period lag exists in both the conditional volatility and 
innovation term. Therefore, the indices and the institutions returns are included in the model 
through a one period lag. 
The procedure to estimate the volatility transmission proceeds as follows. The CDX 
and iTraxx indices are utilised to estimate a VAR-MV (GARCH) system, thereby acting as 
‘regressors’ in the conditional volatility equation. This equation also comprises of each 
individual institution’s equity price and employs a univariate GARCH model to estimate the 
conditional variance: 
 
               
               
        ∑    (    )
 
 
 
 
∑                  
        
            (10) 
 
Where y represents the institutions equity return as the dependent variable and F 
denotes the determinants of the return.   
    and   
       represent the varying conditional 
variance of the CDX and iTraxx respectively. 
An increase in conditional volatility in the dependent equity variance equation would 
signal the impact of the CDS market index on the SIFI share prices. Hence, the index may 
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have a direct contribution to a SIFIs equity return when the index conditional volatility enters 
the equity variance equation with a positive sign. According to Brooks (2008), the sum of the 
GARCH coefficients gives a clear indication to the persistence of the shocks. Thus, a large 
sum of coefficients implies a large index movement in either direction. GARCH coefficients 
α0, α1 and β are, therefore, summed to evaluate volatility shocks from the indices to the equity 
value of the institution. 
It is worth pointing out that the GARCH model adopted in this paper is unable to 
distinguish the asymmetric consequences of positive and negative innovations. However, 
since the model’s goal is to essentially uncover a causal relationship rather than forecast 
future volatility, leverage effects can be somewhat ignored. 
 
4. Empirical Results and Discussion 
 
In this section, we conduct empirical tests with the data specified in Section 2 and the 
model described in Section 3. Results are then analysed and interpreted to draw conclusions. 
To determine how observed short-run fluctuations of the CDS indices influence on 
short-run changes in SIFIs equity returns, we estimate our VAR-MV (GARCH) presented in 
the previous section
4
. 
 
4.1 VAR Results 
 
In this section, we proceed to estimate our VAR model to investigate the validity of 
our assumption. All the results pertain to our sample of 30 institutions. Specifically, two 
VARs are estimated separately for 15 banking SIFIs and 15 insurance sector SIFIs. Next, we 
proceed with a combined analysis of the two sectors. Each individual institution’s equity 
return is combined to the CDS index spread return to form the three variables adopted in the 
VAR analysis (see Equation 10). 
 
4.1.1 VAR Estimates in the Banking Sector 
 
VAR models capture the evolution between bank equity returns and CDS markets. 
One standard deviation impulses are passed through the VAR systems to examine the 
                                                          
4
 Causality, Variance Decomposition, VAR and GARCH statistics are available upon request. 
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reactions of the endogenous variables. In the case of this study, bank equity return is the 
response variable, and the first period’s impulse is included. Furthermore, only in the case of 
stable systems shocks gradually fade away. The results show merely the first period is 
significant for the all systematically important banks and therefore, we exclude impulses over 
subsequent points in time. Through monitoring the effects of shocks in the first period, we 
find that the bank equity returns are negatively correlated to both iTraxx and CDX indices
5
. 
We focus our discussion on the GVD analysis. 
Variance decompositions show how much of the forecast error variance in a variable 
is explained by shocks to the variable itself and other variables. In this paper, this approach is 
employed to investigate the contribution made by the CDX and iTarxx indices towards the 
equity returns variance of the SIFIs. Table 4 reports the results of the two CDS indices 
contribution to the equity returns of the 15 G-SIFIs after 10 periods (t-stat). 
Taken together, our estimates indicate that the explanatory power of the CDX is 
mostly significant for the US group of G-SIFIs. The CDX market factor is marginally 
significant, explaining in each case, only 6.32-8.92% of the variation (Lehman Brothers 
shows the highest CDX variance contribution, 12.68%)6. A key point to note is the marked 
symmetry in the LCFIs equity variance contribution of CDX and iTraxx. The iTraxx 
influence is essentially close to zero for all the US banks within the peer group. 
By contrast, the iTraxx contribution is relatively more important for all the European 
LCFIs (Barclays, Royal Bank of Scotland, BNP Paribas, Societe Generale and UBS) where 
over 10% of their variation is explained by the iTraxx (it ranges from 14.45% (Barclays) to 
11.55%, UBS). 
 
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
 
Both indices demonstrate a significant negative correlation to bank equity returns. An 
increase in CDX or iTraxx spreads drive bank equity returns in the opposite direction, in turn 
impacting on financial stability. In absolute terms, European institutions suffer greater return 
reductions with the largest impact for Barclays, BNP Paribas, RBS and Société Générale. As 
                                                          
5
 Impulse response functions estimates are available upon request. 
6
 As expected, the explained variation estimates are higher than the original data series variance. This is mainly 
due to the dramatic jump in market volatility occurred throughout the 2008. The initial data series results are 
available on request. 
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can be seen from Table 4, this effect is relatively more important for all the American 
banking institutions. 
A number of interesting patterns can be seen in these results. 
Table 4 clearly shows that the CDX tranche index is the main driver contributing to 
the variation of equity returns among all the American banks. Similarly, all European banks 
equity returns exhibit a stronger relationship to the iTraxx index. 
Remarkably, our empirical evidence shows that the enhanced spillover effects’ 
affecting European banks can be attributed primarily to the composition and risk profile of 
banks’ balance sheets. According to DeMarzo (2005) the rationale behind the rapid growth of 
the ABS and MBS markets should be found in traditional asymmetric information problems, 
which made pooling and tranching assets a highly profitable business. Since modern portfolio 
theory states unsystematic risk is reduced through diversifying operations, banks more 
influenced by CDS markets are likely to have over-exposed themselves to credit related 
instruments, thus increasing the systematic risk factor within the financial system. A large 
number of systematically important banks came to the brink of a collapse when in late 2008, 
following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, both the CDX and the iTraxx indices spreads 
dramatically shoot up. Banks thus required immediate emergency government intervention 
and multitrillion bailouts packages to prop up their capital adequacy ratios. A possible 
takeaway from these results is that widening CDS index spreads represent a prominent early 
warning signal for financial stability policies. 
On the other hand, globally active banks such as Goldman Sachs and HSBC are 
affected the least. In fact, these institutions emerged from the crisis in a stronger position than 
their counterparts suggesting that, in such circumstances, a profitable strategy was to ‘lean 
against the wave’. Furthermore, it is important to note that the combined impulses provide a 
clear picture on the overall impact during the financial crisis. Both Goldman Sachs and 
HSBC again emerge as the least likely to threaten global financial stability when the CDS 
market spreads increase (see Table 4). In contrast, the UK institutions, namely Barclays and 
RBS, are severely exposed in the face of a global economy downturn and when CDS index 
spreads are increasing. 
These results relate to the contemporaneous paper by Yang and Zhou (2011) who find 
a particularly strong influence of Lehman Brothers on Bear Stearns (29-33%), Goldman 
Sachs (35-42%), Merrill Lynch (21-26%), Wachovia (22-27%), Citigroup (9-12%) and JP 
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Morgan (10%) at all horizons
7
. These results also complement Diebold and Yilmaz (2014) 
who empirically document that, on the announcement of its bankruptcy (15 September 2008), 
Lehman Brothers was the most influential in terms of volatility connectedness (6%). 
By contrast and somewhat interestingly, these results deviate from Calice and 
Ioannidis (2012) who find that the transmission impact of the CDX is significantly larger for 
banks domiciled in continental Europe and UK as opposed to the US. 
 
4.1.2 VAR Estimates in the Insurance Sector 
 
We turn now our analysis to the internationally active SIFIs from the insurance sector. 
We perform VAR analysis to uncover the empirical relationship between the returns of each 
individual insurance firm and the returns of the CDS indices. We employ GVDs to estimate 
the relative impact of CDX and iTraxx indices on the endogenous variables. The 
systematically insurance companies equity returns are thus the response variables in the 
system (see Table 5). We can clearly see that shocks gradually disappear within ten periods 
for all the institutions. 
 
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
 
Taken together, the estimated VAR results show that shocks originating from the 
CDX and the iTraxx have a significant impact on the institutions stock returns. All the GVDs 
clearly document a significant contribution of the returns of the index series to the equity 
returns of the global insurance companies. 
Note that all of the European institutions are essentially sensitive to the iTraxx CDS 
market. ING, AEGON, AXA and Prudential display the strongest response among the 
insurers, with all being significantly affected by shocks in the iTraxx index. 
The Netherlands-based institutions appear the most vulnerable to shocks in the CDS 
index market. Noteworthy, this result is confirmed by the €10billion Dutch government 
bailout of ING towards the end of 2008 as CDS indices premia dramatically widened. 
AIG and MetLife are the American institutions most severely influenced by shocks to 
the CDS indices. AIG faced the most difficult financial crisis in its history when a series of 
                                                          
7
.No other US financial institutions exhibit such an extensive and significant role of credit risk information 
spillovers. Thus suggests that the decision not to bail out Lehman Brothers was probably a serious mistake and 
certainly worsened the global credit crisis. 
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events unfolded in late 2008, eventually leading the Federal Reserve to engineer an $85 
billion rescue package, making it the largest government bailout of a private company in US 
history. The results for MetLife are somewhat surprising due to the low profile maintained by 
the insurer during the crisis. Nevertheless, a possible reason for this is the downgrading of 
MetLife’s credit rating to A+ by Standard and Poor’s. In contrast to the AA+ credit rating in 
early 2007, the downgrade reveals a negative impact on the insurer’s financial position. 
Interestingly, when combining the GVDs estimates for both the iTraxx and the CDX 
indices, we can observe three common patterns among individual insurers during the global 
financial crisis. First, when the CDS indices spreads peaked in late 2008, equity returns for 
ING, AEGON and AXA deteriorated more significantly than the reinsurance companies. 
Second, trends in location are less distinguishable in the insurance sector. Third, the overall 
impact amongst insurers is significantly higher than the in banking sector. Therefore, these 
findings lend support to the notion that the insurance sector is more segregated in terms of 
CDs trading. 
 
4.1.3 Combined VAR Estimates in the Financial Sector 
 
The estimated VARs uncover a significant linkage between movements in CDS index 
spreads and institutions equity returns for all the SIFIs. Over the six and a half year sample 
period, all the US-based institutions appear more heavily influenced the CDX index. 
Similarly, all the institutions based in Europe are more significantly affected by the iTraxx 
index. Thus quite remarkably, our empirical evidence uncovers a strong association between 
the geographical location of a financial institution and the corresponding US or European 
CDS index market. 
All in all, our estimates illustrate a strong link between the CDX index and the US 
SIFIs. In particular, they highlight the importance of the long-run impact of the North 
American investment-grade credit index on the banks equity performance. 
Notably, our findings indicate that the SIFIs from the insurance sector are more prone 
to shocks in the CDS market, with ING and Berkshire Hathaway being subject to the largest 
and smallest impacts, respectively. The results therefore imply that the insurance sector is 
much more segregated in CDs trading activity since derivative transactions are considered 
‘non-core’ activities in the insurance sector (see, Cummins and Weiss (2010). 
As shown in Table 5, despite being the largest shareholder in Wells Fargo, Berkshire 
Hathaway appears as the most stable insurer in terms of resilience to shocks originating from 
19 
 
the CDS index. HSBC exhibits a similar low statistic in contrast to other banking institutions. 
As such, it seems reasonable to assume that Berkshire Hathaway and HSBC are least likely to 
endure instability as CDS markets develop. However, it is important to note that counterparty 
risk is likely to rise for these institutions in times of crisis. In turn, significant increases in 
counterparty risk will have the effect of reducing credit supply as seen in the period 
immediately preceding the 2007 subprime crisis. 
The impact of the ‘non-dominant’ index on the banking and insurance sectors provide 
direct evidence about the degree of diversification into global CDS intermediation businesses. 
As a general pattern, we find that the insurance sector SIFIs exhibit greater international 
diversification in comparison to the banking sector. We derive our results by using the CDS 
globalisation ratio: 
 
CDS globalisation ratio = Non-Dominant Index / Dominant Index 
 
Note that a value close to one suggests a more active engagement of a SIFI in credit 
related activities
8
. Taken together, our results illustrate that the banking SIFIs in general lag 
behind the insurance SIFIs as for the level of global CDS diversification (see Figure 2). In 
accordance to portfolio theory, insurers are regarded as less exposed to a domestic financial 
crisis, since only a fraction of their ‘non core’ business is affected. Banks, on the other hand 
(with the exception of Deutsche Bank), are in a predominantly weaker position and, 
therefore, are likely to be affected more severely during times of high volatility. Banking 
institutions thus pose potentially a greater threat to financial stability as opposed to the more 
globally CDS diversified SIFIs insurers. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
 
 4.2 Volatility Transmission Results 
 
In this section, we examine the impact of the structured credit market volatility on the 
SIFIs equity returns using a univariate GARCH model. Furthermore, as discussed earlier, we 
obtain the estimates of the conditional volatilities of the two indices from a multivariate 
                                                          
8
 The results are available upon request. 
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GARCH (1,1) model using a Diagonal BEEK specification9. The estimated GARCH 
coefficients are presented in accordance with equation (11). Recall from earlier discussion 
that a larger sum of coefficients implies that the institutions variance of returns will be higher 
for an extended period, under conditions of elevated volatility in the CDS markets. In other 
words, when the lagged conditional variance is closer to unity (exactly one), prolonged 
volatility clusters are likely to appear. 
 
4.2.1 GARCH Estimates in the Banking Sector 
 
The significance of the GARCH coefficients are statistically computed and compared 
to determine the transmission of volatility effects from CDS index markets into the banking 
institutions equity prices (see Table 6). 
 
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE 
 
Our findings above indicate that the sums of the lagged coefficient are always close to 
one, revealing a large impact on the dependent variable. This suggests a persistent 
transmission of volatility between the CDX and iTraxx indices and the banks equity prices. 
Excessive volatility in the CDS market can lead to considerable increases in volatility in the 
banking sector thereby exacerbating the fragility of the financial sector. Consistent with the 
definition of financial stability proposed by Cihak (2007) and Segoviano and Goodhart 
(2009)
10
, the probability of possible shocks spreading throughout the financial system are 
therefore extremely significant for all the systematically important banks. 
Another important result from Table 6 is the positioning of US institutions. The 
empirical results for Lehman Brothers, Citigroup and Goldman Sachs suggest the 
transmission impact is larger for banks situated in the US, as opposed to banks based in 
Europe. Consequently, the US institutions are prone to larger systematic risk since large 
swings in either direction in the CDS index market significantly affect banks share prices. 
The coefficients from the GARCH estimates imply that, in the long run, increases in 
CDS market volatility are associated with a substantial increase in the SIFIs equity risk. 
Despite volatility impacts remaining at low levels for Société Générale and Credit Suisse, the 
                                                          
9
 The results are available on request. 
10
 Both papers posit that a good measure of systemic stability has to incorporate two fundamental components: 
the probability of an individual financial institution defaulting, and the probability and speed of possible shocks 
spreading throughout industry. 
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coefficients are nonetheless significantly high. All in all, our findings show that amplified 
volatility in the CDS market render the whole banking sector systematically more vulnerable 
to shocks. 
 
4.2.2 GARCH Estimates in the Insurance Sector 
 
GARCH coefficients are again computed for the insurance companies to better 
understand volatility transmission effects in the insurance sector (see Table 7). 
 
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE 
 
Since the coefficients are adjacent to ‘unity’, volatility transmissions are highly 
significant in the insurance sector. Interestingly, we can also observe a significant negative 
relationship between the volatility of the CDS index market and the stock return volatility of 
our 15 SIFIs insurance sample. Our empirical evidence suggests that an unexpected shock in 
the CDX or iTraxx can increase the conditional variance in the insurer’s equity price. 
With the sole exception of Berkshire Hathaway, estimations for the US insurance 
companies are generally higher than their European counterparts. Hence, the equity variance 
stands high for a protracted period when CDS indices exhibit high levels of volatility. 
As it is shown by the large range of summed coefficients of the VAR analysis, the 
impact on the insurance sector appears far more differentiated. Furthermore, this result is 
even pronounced during the 2008 crisis. Interestingly, we can see that AIG, Manulife and 
Assicurazioni Generali are significantly more sensitive to shocks in the CDS index market. 
 
4.2.3 Volatility Impact on the Combined Financial Sector 
 
The estimated coefficients are significant in both the banking and insurance sector. 
However, from Figure 3 we can see that banking institutions are subject to larger impacts 
than the insurance companies. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 3 
 
We can achieve a better understanding of the factors behind the greater sensitivity of 
the banks equity prices to volatility shocks in the CDS index markets through a closer 
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inspection into their core operations over the financial crisis period. Financial intermediaries 
retained the major proportion of credit losses arising from subprime mortgage back securities, 
even though the main objective was to package and disperse credit risk to investors more 
financially able to absorb losses. Choudhary and Landyut (2010) argue that banking is a 
business based on confidence and enhanced uncertainty will always lead customers to unwind 
positions and withdraw deposits on a large scale. Since only a fraction of liabilities are held 
in bank reserves, deteriorating confidence levels are often a market signal for instability. 
Arguably, the results in Figure 3 could reflect to some extent the critical role of confidence, 
since swings in volatility are transmitted more severely into the banking sector. 
Another credible argument explaining the positioning of the banking institutions 
draws upon the VAR results discussed previously. Banking institutions are less globally 
diversified than insurers in terms of CD activities (see Figure 3). The overall concentration of 
credit risk is thus greater in the banking sector, as it is evident by a larger degree of exposure 
to subprime instruments for both Lehman Brothers and Citi. Accordingly, specialised and 
undiversified SIFIs augment systemic risk in the banking sector and consequently are subject 
to the largest volatility impacts. 
AIG and Manulife are, however, notable exceptions and are more involved in the 
‘non-core’ insurance activities compared to the insurance companies least affected by 
volatility shocks. AIG and Manulife are consequently subject to greater impacts of volatility 
transmission due to their exposure to credit derivatives instruments. 
More generally, our findings clearly suggest that the US institutions as a group appear 
to be the major ‘receiver’ of CDS volatility in contemporaneous time and thus they actually 
pose greater systemic risk. Obviously, future research is needed to further investigate the 
issue. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This paper represents an attempt to understand some of the aspects of the potential 
relationship between the CDS index market and the banking and insurance sector. For this we 
focus on default risk as perceived by the market through SIFIs share prices. 
This paper contributes to the rapidly growing literature on CDs through establishing 
an empirical relationship between CDS index markets and the equity value of a group of 
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SIFIs. A multivariate VAR approach enabled a verification of the linkages between the SIFIs 
and the CDX and iTraxx investment grade CDS indices. 
The results from the Granger causality test show a strong connection between the 
CDS indices. In particular, we uncover a leading role in terms of pricing discovery for the 
five year investment grade CDX since with respect to the five year investment grade iTraxx 
Europe. Although markets are normally inclined to follow the ‘random walk’, our empirical 
analysis demonstrates arbitrage opportunities may exist for market participants with the 
resources to take positions in a timely manner. Arbitrage opportunities however, are likely to 
disappear very quickly as efficient markets adjust spreads back to equilibrium. 
Moreover, we find that the equity returns of all the SIFIs are significantly negatively 
related to changes in the CDX and iTraxx indices. Taken together, our empirical results show 
that large shocks in the CDS index market can substantially destabilise the financial system 
since all of the thirty SIFIs are prone to significant impacts. 
Quite strikingly, our empirical evidence uncovers a strong association of negative sign 
between the geographical location of a SIFI and shocks in the corresponding CDS index 
market. Accordingly, the iTraxx exhibits a more dominant effect on all European institutions 
selected in the study, whilst the CDX demonstrates a larger impact on the US institutions. 
These results are somewhat surprising and their economic importance is significant. For 
instance, they seem to tell us that globalisation has a neutral impact on international 
diversification activities. However, remarkably a larger ‘non-dominant’ index impact on the 
insurers suggests the insurance sector is diversifying its activities on both sides of the Atlantic 
at a faster pace than the banking sector. Furthermore, the sector’s higher global CDS ratios 
suggest insurers are less inclined to disrupt financial stability (with the exceptions of AXA 
and Prudential), since only a global financial meltdown can disrupt operations. In contrast, 
domestic events can subsequently put a strain on a nation’s financial system due to the 
relative rigidity of the banking sector. 
We utilise a GARCH model to establish volatility transmission effects from credit 
markets into the systematically important institutions share prices. One particular intriguing 
result of our analysis is that the volatility of the SIFIs equity returns are highly positively 
related to the volatility of the CDX and iTraxx indices. Thus, as CDS markets become more 
volatile, then the conditional volatility of the stock market values of all the SIFIs deteriorate. 
This argues that systemic risk may arise largely through the global financial system. This 
result is also in line with previous empirical findings by Ang and Longstaff (2013). 
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The extent institutions participate in ‘core banking activities’ considerably influence 
the length and size of volatility clusters. Moreover, international diversification displays a 
significant linkage with the volatility transmission mechanism. Another intriguing pattern is 
that the majority of banks and insurers included in the study reveal a reduced volatility 
impact when diversifying into international markets. Since the insurance sector is more 
diversified, the volatility transmission from CDS index markets is less of a concern during 
the period covered by this study. However, all institutions with high exposure to US subprime 
instruments are adversely affected. 
The findings of the paper identify a challenge for financial regulation. In particular, they 
highlight at least two important implications for an effective regulation of these institutions. 
To begin with, institutions can benefit significantly through diversifying CDS exposure 
globally, in contrast to merely a specified region. Banks and insurers over-exposed to US 
subprime mortgages suffered considerably higher equity return reductions, in comparison to 
the more diverse institutions. Moreover, the contagion effect sent shockwaves throughout the 
industry and thus, severely disputed financial stability. 
Moreover, a larger emphasis on regulation in the insurance sector is essential to 
discouraging insurers from practices aimed at taking on excessive risk. As the convergence 
between insurance and banking accelerates, integrated regulation is an essential macro-
prudential requirement to ensure the risk associated with ‘non-core’ insurance activities is 
managed prudently. Furthermore, new players are urged to better understand the potential 
implications of CRT to enhance survivability during times of severe stress. 
Overall, this paper widens the scope for further research on CDS markets. Investigating 
market correlations with speculative grade corporate entities and other market participants 
(such as hedge funds) will enhance the understanding of shocks and volatility transfer 
between markets. Furthermore, future work exploring the potential issue of non-linear 
dependence between the indices and their relation with equity returns will greatly 
complement the findings of this study. 
The results in this paper have many important implications for financial stability. Clearly, 
future work is needed to understand the deep reasons for the strong relation between 
corporate credit risk markets and SIFIs. 
  
25 
 
References 
 
Allen, F. & Gale, D. (2004). Financial Fragility, Liquidity, and Asset Prices, Journal of the 
European Economic Association, Issue. 2, pp. 1015–1048. 
Allen F., Carletti E., (2006), Credit Risk Transfer and Contagion, Journal of Monetary 
Economics, No. 53, pp. 80-111. 
Ang, A. and Longstaff, F.A. (2013), Systemic Sovereign Credit Risk: Lessons from the U.S. 
and Europe, Journal of Monetary Economics, 60 (5), 493-510. 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, (November 2011), Global Systemically Important 
Banks: Assessment Methodology and the Additional Loss Absorbency Requirement, Bank 
for International Settlements. 
Borio, C., (2003), Towards a Macroprudential Framework for Financial Supervision and 
Regulation, BIS Working Papers, No. 128. 
Brunnermeier, M. K. (2008), Deciphering the 2007-08 Liquidity and Credit Crunch, Journal 
of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 23, No. 1. pp. 79 & 82–85. 
Calice, G., Ioannidis, C., (2012), An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of the Credit Default 
Swap Index Market on Large Complex Financial Institutions, International Review of 
Financial Analysis, 25, 117-130. 
Chari V. V., Kehoe P., McGrattan E., (2005), A Critique of Structural VARs Using Real 
Business Cycle Theory, Federal Reserve of Minneapolis Research Department, Working 
Paper No. 631. 
Choudhary, M. & Landuyt, G. (2010), Regulating Bank Systemic Risk: New Principles in 
Macroprudential Management, Global Journal of Management and Business Research, Vol. 
10, Issue. 1, pp. 88. & 89. 
Čihák, M. (2006), How do Central Banks Write on Financial Stability?” IMF Working Paper, 
No. 06/163, pp. 9. 
De Marzo P., (2005), The Pooling and Tranching of Securities: A Model of Informed 
Intermediation, Review of Financial Studies, 2005, 18, 1-35. 
26 
 
Diebold, F.X. and Yilmaz, K. (2014), On the Network Topology of Variance 
Decompositions: Measuring the Connectedness of Financial Firms, Journal of Econometrics, 
forthcoming. 
Duffie, D. (2008), Innovations in Credit Risk Transfer: Implications for Financial stability, 
BIS Working Paper, No. 255, pp. 25–29. 
Financial Stability Board, (November 2011), "List of Systemically Important Financial 
Institutions", Bank for International Settlements. 
Gorton, G. (2009), The Subprime Panic, European Financial Management, 15(1), pp. 10-46. 
International Association of Insurance Supervisors, (July 2013), Global Systemically 
Important Insurers: Initial Assessment Methodology. 
Koop G. Pesaran M. H., Potter S. M., (1996), Impulse Response Analysis in Nonlinear 
Multivariate Models, Journal of Econometrics, 74: 119–147. 
Lee, W. Y., Jiang, C.  X. & Indro, D. C., (2002), Stock Market Volatility, Excess Returns and 
the Role of Investor Sentiment. Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 26, No. 12,   pp. 2278–
2281. 
Longstaff F. A., (2010), The Subprime Credit Crisis and Contagion in Financial Markets, 
Journal of Financial Economics, No. 97, pp. 436–450. 
Pesaran, M. H. & Shin, Y. (1998), Generalised Impulse Response Analysis in Linear 
Multivariate Models, Economics Letters, No. 58, pp. 17–20. 
Segoviano, M. and Goodhart, C. (2009), Banking Stability Measures, IMF Working Paper 
09/04. 
Sims, C. A., (1980), Macroeconomics and Reality, Econometrica, Vol. 48, No 1, pp. 1-48. 
Sims, C. A. (1992), Interpreting the Macroeconomic Time Series Facts: The Effects of 
Monetary Policy, European Economic Review, No. 36, pp. 975–976. 
Standard and Poor’s, Sovereign Credit Rating List, [Online], Available: 
http://www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/sovereigns/ratings-list/en/us/?subSectorC ode=39, 
[Accessed: 29 July 2011]. 
27 
 
Stock, J. & Watson, M. (1999), Forecasting Inflation, Journal of Monetary Economics, 
Edition. 
Yang, Jian, and Yinggang Zhou. "Credit Risk Spillovers among Financial Institutions around 
the Global Credit Crisis: Firm-Level Evidence," Management Science, Vol. 59, No. 10, 
October 2013, pp. 2343-2359. 
